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Abstract
Security protocols are often specified at the appli-
cation layer ; however, application layer specifica-
tions give little detail regarding message data struc-
tures at the presentation layer upon which some
implementation-dependent attacks rely. In this pa-
per we present an approach to verifying security pro-
tocols in which both the application and presentation
layers are modelled. Using the Group Domain of In-
terpretation protocol as an example, our application
layer specification of the protocol is used as input to
the AVISPA model checking tool for analysis. Two
type flaw attacks are found via model checking which
are then verified against the corresponding presenta-
tion layer specification, thus identifying the minimal
requirements to prevent the attacks.
1 Introduction
Electronic communication is now the predominant
means of interaction for commercial, industrial, and
private use. In response to this trend, it is important
to ensure that transmitted information is not compro-
mised by malicious parties, especially in areas such as
defence, medicine, and commerce, where information
leakage and corruption could have catastrophic conse-
quences. In order to shield ourselves against potential
threats, communication messages are secured by ap-
plication of cryptographic functions and sent as part
of ordered message sequences called security protocols.
Informal narrations that mix natural language and
ad hoc notations (Abadi 2000), such as the standard
notation (Carlsen 1994), conveniently describe secu-
rity protocols at the application layer — the level
at which message content is determined. However,
standard notation descriptions do not indicate pre-
cisely what internal actions are required by protocol
agents implementing them, nor does it suggest de-
sirable properties of message items or cryptographic
functions used. Furthermore, the standard notation
gives little detail regarding message data structures
at the presentation layer — the level at which the
low-level representation of messages is determined
— upon which some implementation-dependent at-
tacks such as type flaw attacks rely. A lack of pre-
cise details at either of these layers can lead to mis-
understandings and disputes over protocol correct-
ness (Boyd 1990, Boyd & Mao 1993).
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Formal methods provide well-defined languages
that allow precise specifications to be written and
subsequent rigorous verification procedures to be per-
formed. Hence, the use of formal methods is advo-
cated for the design and analysis of security proto-
cols (Gollmann 2003). The Common Criteria (The
Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations
1999), an internationally recognised set of criteria for
evaluating security critical products, demands strict
application of formal methods to the development
process for achieving the highest assurance levels.
Therefore, we are interested in the use of formal meth-
ods for specifying precise details of security protocols,
and for analysing specifications of security protocols
for potential attacks.
Type flaw attacks (Boyd 1990) occur at the presen-
tation layer when intruders send unexpected messages
to protocol agents who subsequently misinterpret the
bit string encoding of message item types. For ex-
ample, a type flaw attack may occur when a single
message item of one type is confused with a single
item of another type, or when a single message item
of one type is confused with the concatenation of two
or more other items of varying types. Type flaw at-
tacks can be prevented by the use of ‘tags’ (Heather,
Lowe & Schneider 2000), but problems can arise when
a protocol interacts with another protocol that does
not use a tagging scheme, or tags data in a different
way (Meadows, Syverson & Cervesato 2004) (such as
the attack on the GDOI protocol described in Sec-
tion 6).
Nevertheless, we seek to find the necessary and
not merely the sufficient. Hence for a particular
attack, we want to identify the specific weaknesses
upon which an attack depends in order to minimise
the effort required to prevent it. Over-protective
tagging schemes can unnecessarily increase message
sizes, complexity and other communication over-
heads. Battery-powered embedded systems such as
PDAs, cell phones, networked sensors and smart cards
require such overheads to be minimal (Potlapally,
Ravi, Raghunathan & Jha 2003). In these systems,
minimising the resources needed to prevent potential
attacks is clearly beneficial.
Generally, security protocol analysis tools have not
been very good at finding type flaw attacks (Meadows
2003). Although more advanced tools exist (Meadows
et al. 2004, Armando et al. 2005) that are capable of
finding type flaw attacks, their analyses are based on
high-level application layer specifications. However,
by relying on application layer specifications, proofs
of correctness may not be accurate with respect to the
implementation of the protocol at the lower presenta-
tion layer. For example, attacks are sometimes found
that are actually prevented by implicit presentation
layer behaviour, and sometimes presentation layer at-
tacks are completely overlooked. Furthermore, it is
difficult to add detailed presentation layer corrections
to application layer specifications, due to the level of
abstraction exhibited at the application layer; often
corrections are presented informally or the entire de-
sign is changed. Once a type flaw attack has been
discovered at the application layer, we need a way
of verifying whether the attack is possible given the
presentation layer specification, and to confirm the
required presentation layer correction for inclusion in
the formal specification.
In this paper we bridge the gap between the appli-
cation and presentation layers by providing a frame-
work for specifying security protocols for formal anal-
yses at both levels of abstraction. Conveniently, we
produce a single formal specification in which the pre-
sentation layer is transparent but easily reasoned with
when required, thus improving readability and sim-
plifying translation for input to off-the-shelf analy-
sis tools. We demonstrate our approach by provid-
ing a multi-layered formal specification of the Group
Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol (Baugher,
Hardjono, Harney & Weis 2001) in Object-Z (Duke &
Rose 2000). The application layer model is analysed
using the AVISPA model checking tool (Armando et
al. 2005) to find two type flaw attacks. The attacks
are then verified against the presentation layer model
using Object-Z’s schema calculus, and the particular
presentation layer requirements required to prevent
the attacks are formally derived for inclusion in the
formal specification.
2 Related Work
In previous research Donovan et al. (1999) used CSP
with the FDR model checker to analyse cryptographic
protocols. They state that their approach is not good
at finding type flaws. This is no doubt due to the
lack of data structure support in the CSP model —
message structure is captured in the event name.
Carlsen (1993) modified the logic of Communica-
tion, Knowledge and Time (CKT5) for analysis of
cryptographic protocols, and demonstrated his ap-
proach by finding a type flaw attack on a version
of the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol. The attack
depends on confusion between a nonce1 and a key.
Carlsen found this attack by assuming that each item
belonging to a particular type was distinct from items
in all other types, and then by imposing a special re-
quirement that nonces and keys were not necessarily
distinct.
Bozzano and Delzanno (2002) used linear logic to
discover that Millen’s ffgg protocol (Millen 1999) is
vulnerable to an attack which also requires one item
to be interpreted as another. They assumed infor-
mally that the attack requires all items to have the
same length. Bozzano (2002) used the same method
to discover the type flaw attack on the Otway-Rees
protocol. To allow for several items to be read as one,
he introduced an extra concatenation operator cons
to “glue together” different items in the message.
Theya et al. (1998) have used strand spaces to
analyse cryptographic protocols. In this formalism,
protocol correctness claims are expressed in terms
of the connections between sequences of legitimate
and/or intruder actions. Type flaw attacks are
catered for by allowing unification of single items or
pairs of items with other single items.
Cervesato (2001) used the strongly-typed Multi-
set Rewriting (MSR) language which is based on term
rewriting, linear logic and type theory, to express type
1A nonce (Gong 1993) is a datum that is unique to each protocol
instance.
flaw attacks. He uses polymorphism to allow for ‘con-
fusable types’; the user of the approach decides which
types are confusable in order to find type flaw attacks.
The attacks considered in these approaches gener-
ally involve simple ‘type confusion’, in which message
items of one type are confused with items of another
type, or in the more advanced models, in which an
item of one type is confused with the concatenation
of two or more other items of varying types. For in-
stance, Figure 1 shows two identical bit string rep-
resentations of a message at the presentation layer
consisting of an agent identifier and a nonce, and for
each, an alternative way of interpreting the message
at the application layer. The first illustrates the sce-
nario in which the single nonce item is interpreted
as a key, and the second illustrates the scenario in
which the concatenation of the agent identifier with
the nonce is interpreted as a key.
agent id︷ ︸︸ ︷
0001 0011
nonce︷ ︸︸ ︷
0111 1111︸ ︷︷ ︸
agent id
︸ ︷︷ ︸
key
agent id︷ ︸︸ ︷
0001 0011
nonce︷ ︸︸ ︷
0111 1111︸ ︷︷ ︸
key
Figure 1: Misinterpretation of message items.
Meadows (2002) highlighted the further possibil-
ity of attacks in which sub-items of one type may
be confused with sub-items of another type. This
is particularly imaginable in the case where agents
use different parsing algorithms for different proto-
cols. In Figure 2, for instance, not only is the mes-
sage interpreted at the application layer to consist of
different types, but the item lengths are not even the
same. Motivated by this, Meadows (2003) investi-
gated a presentation layer procedure for determining
the probability of any kind of type confusion occur-
ring for any two pairs of protocol messages.
agent id︷ ︸︸ ︷
0001 0011
nonce︷ ︸︸ ︷
0111 1111︸ ︷︷ ︸
nonce
︸ ︷︷ ︸
key
Figure 2: Misinterpretation of message sub-items.
Recently Meadows et al. (2004) analysed the
GDOI protocol using the purpose-built NRL Protocol
Analyzer to find a type flaw attack (Attack B) that
takes advantage of the fact that GDOI is built on top
of a protocol that does not tag message headers. Dis-
covery of the attack also led to the manual discovery
of a second type flaw attack (Attack A). Unfortu-
nately, the tool could not have found Attack A since
it lacked the ability to model associativity of message
concatenation.
On the other hand, the AVISPA tool (Armando
et al. 2005) handles associativity of message concate-
nation, so we were convinced it would successfully
find both type flaw attacks on the GDOI protocol.
Nevertheless, most protocol analysis tools (includ-
ing AVISPA) are aimed at application layer models.
Hence, it is difficult to include specific presentation
layer requirements, for verification of the presentation
layer specification.
Previously we demonstrated the value of using the
Object-Z formal specification language for reasoning
about the kind of type flaw attacks illustrated in Fig-
1. A −→ S : M , {h(NA,G),NA,G}KAS
2. S −→ A : M , {h(NA,NS ,SA),NS ,SA}KAS
3. A −→ S : M , {h(NA,NS , {NA,NS}K−1
A
), {NA,NS}K−1
A
}KAS
4. S −→ A : M , {h(NA,NS ,Q ,K , {NA,NS}K−1
S
),Q ,K , {NA,NS}K−1
S
}KAS
Figure 3: Group Key Pull protocol.
ures 1 and 2, enabling us to determine whether poten-
tial type flaw attacks are, or are not, actually possible
for a given presentation layer specification of a secu-
rity protocol (Long 2005). In this paper we bridge the
gap between application and presentation layer veri-
fication by taking advantage of the AVISPA tool for
automated analysis at the application layer followed
by formal proof at the presentation layer.
3 The GDOI Protocol
The Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) proto-
col (Baugher et al. 2001) is proposed for group key
distribution, in which each key is secret to a group of
agents for secure communication amongst its mem-
bers. Based on related work by Meadows et al. (2004),
its two subprotocols relevant to our analysis are de-
scribed below.
3.1 Group Key Pull Protocol
Agents wishing to join a group take part in the Group
Key Pull protocol to learn the current group key (de-
scribed using the standard notation in Figure 3).
In step 1, the new group member, Alice A, sends
a message consisting of her nonce NA, the name G
of the group she wishes to join, and a hash of these
items h(NA,G), all encrypted (denoted by ‘{}’) using
the key KAS shared by her and the server, Sam S . A
message header M is prepended to the message.
In step 2, Sam responds by sending Alice a mes-
sage consisting of his nonce NS , the security associ-
ation SA, and a hash of these items accompanied by
Alice’s nonce, again encrypted and prepended by the
message header. The security association describes
the security functions and policies used by the group.
In step 3, using her private key K−1A , Alice creates
a signature from the two nonces. Her request for a
key (message 3) contains this signature, and a hash
of the signature accompanied by the original nonce
values.
Like Alice, Sam creates a signature using his pri-
vate key K−1S from the two nonces, and in step 4 sends
a similar message to Alice containing the current se-
quence numberQ , and the current group keyK . (The
sequence number must be known by all group mem-
bers for use in the Group Key Push protocol.) Alice
authenticates message 4 by ensuring the nonce values
are the same as those she signed in message 3, and
records the sequence number Q and key K for subse-
quent secure communication amongst the group.
3.2 Group Key Push Protocol
The group key is changed for the entire group by hav-
ing all members act in Alice’s role for the Group Key
Push protocol described in Figure 4.
5.S −→ A : M , {Q ,SA,K ∗, {M ,Q ,SA,K ∗}K−1
S
}K
Figure 4: Group Key Push protocol.
In this single message protocol, Sam sends a mes-
sage to Alice containing the sequence number, secu-
rity association, and the new group key K ∗, along
with a signature taken over the entire content includ-
ing the message header. The message is encrypted
using the current group key K . The sequence num-
ber is incremented by Sam each time the group key
is changed so as to avoid the possibility of replay at-
tacks on this protocol. Therefore, on receipt of this
message, Alice checks that the sequence number is the
one expected before accepting the key K ∗ as the new
group key.
4 Specifying GDOI in Object-Z
Object-Z (Duke & Rose 2000) is an object-oriented
formal specification language in which set theory and
logic is used to describe the internal states of system
classes and the behaviour of class operations on those
states. In previous work (Long 2005) we presented
Object-Z data types for modelling messages at the
presentation layer. We reuse these structures for the
foundation of this specification.
We assume a given set ATOM of ‘atoms’ from
which all messages are constructed at the presenta-
tion layer (for example, bits or bytes). Then the set
of all messagesMSG is the set of all possible sequences
of atoms.
MSG == seqATOM
Then we declare eight subsets of MSG for the dif-
ferent types of data items that exist at the applica-
tion layer: header items HID , nonces NON , group
identifiers GID , security associations SEC , sequence
numbers SEQ , keys KEY , encrypted items ENS and
hashed items HSH .
HDR,NON ,GID ,SEC : PMSG
SEQ ,KEY ,ENC ,HSH : PMSG
The subsets are not necessarily disjoint which means
that individual items may belong to one or more sub-
sets of MSG . Keys are divided into another three
subsets (symmetric keys SYM , public keys PUB and
private keys PRV ) enabling us to model both sym-
metric key and public key encryption.
SYM ,PUB ,PRV : PKEY
To allow for analyses of type flaw attacks, our
data structures let different agents interpret the same
message as consisting of different sequences of typed
items. However, when two agents ‘speak the same
language’ or agree on the type structure of the mes-
sage, there should be no ambiguity.
Instead of enforcing a specific correlation between
the application and presentation layers, we assume
the following global axiom which says that if two
agents both interpret the initial part of a message to
be a particular type of item, then the values they asso-
ciate with this item are identical. (The sequence con-
catenation operator ‘a’ forms a single message from
the two supplied messages.)
(∀m,n : HDR; o, p : MSG •
m a o = n a p ⇒ m = n)
Thus, if two identical messages ‘m a o’ and ‘n a p’
begin with items m and n, both of which are inter-
preted to be of type HDR, then m and n must be
the same message header. We have omitted the pred-
icates constraining the other item types for the sake
of brevity.
Our approach relies on unifying messages en-
crypted with the same key. To enable this, the en-
crypt function enc ensures that for every key there is
a unique function that produces a unique encrypted
item for each message.
enc : KEY ½ (MSG ½ ENC )
The hash function hsh used by the Group Key Pull
protocol takes a key as input. The following specifica-
tion ensures that for every key there is a unique func-
tion that produces at most one corresponding hash
value for each message.
hsh : KEY ½ (MSG → HSH )
Each public key is associated with a unique private
key (its inverse) as specified by the function inv . In
practice, this function is not one that would be glob-
ally available for use by protocol agents. However,
it is convenient to have this association formalised.
Then for the purpose of our specification we only need
to allocate public keys to agents; private keys can be
accessed using the inv function. In Section 5 we use
a model checking tool for verification that provides
a function inv associating public and private keys in
the same way.
inv : PUB ½ PRV
4.1 Protocol Roles
Although protocol descriptions refer to agents by
name, in reality these protocols can be run between
any pair of agents. In fact, when we refer to agent
Alice, Alice is the name we are giving, not to the
agent participating in the interaction, but to the
role the agent is participating in. We could model
the protocol as a single system or as the interac-
tion of specific agents. However, as in other ap-
proaches (Snekkenes 1992, Ryan, Schneider, Gold-
smith, Lowe & Roscoe 2000), we choose to model the
protocol in terms of protocol roles and the interac-
tions between them.
Between the two subprotocols, there is a total
of four roles agents can play: AlicePULL, SamPULL,
AlicePUSH and SamPUSH . Each role is captured
within a single Object-Z class specification, includ-
ing only information and operations relevant to the
role it is modelling.
The first class AlicePULL corresponds to Alice’s
role in the Group Key Pull protocol. All items used
by Alice in this role are declared as state variables
in the state schema. Alice is required to generate a
‘fresh’ value for her nonce NA and the message header
M for each protocol instance. To allow for this, Alice
keeps a record used of previously used items.
AlicePULL
M : HDR; NA,NS : NON ; G : GID
Q : SEQ ; SA : SEC ; KAS ,K : SYM
KA,KS : PUB ; used : PMSG
initiate
∆(M ,NA, used)
msg! : MSG
M ′ 6∈ used ∧ NA′ 6∈ used
used ′ = used ∪ {M ′,NA′}
msg! = M ′ a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA′ a
G)aNA′ aG)
requestKey
∆(NS ,SA)
msg?,msg! : MSG
msg? = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA a
NS
′ a SA′)aNS ′ a SA′)
msg! = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA a
NS
′ a enc(inv(KA))(NA aNS ′))a
enc(inv(KA))(NA
aNS ′))
pullKey
∆(K ,Q)
msg? : MSG
msg? = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA aNS a
Q ′ aK ′ a enc(inv(KS ))(NA aNS ))a
Q ′ aK ′ a enc(inv(KS ))(NA aNS ))
Within operation schemas, pre-state variables are
undecorated and denote the value before execution of
the operation, whereas post-state variables are deco-
rated with a prime ‘′’ and denote the value after exe-
cution of the operation. The symbol ‘∆’ declares pre-
state and post-state variables for each of the named
variables, indicating that they may be changed by the
operation. Incoming and outgoing messages are spec-
ified using input and output variables, denoted by ‘?’
and ‘!’ respectively.
Operation initiate corresponds to step 1 of the
Group Key Pull protocol. Alice chooses fresh val-
ues for her nonce N ′A and the message header M
′ by
checking that they do not yet belong to the set used
of previously used values. She updates her record of
used items to include these values using the set union
operator. Appropriate functions are applied to the
items required to construct message 1 and the output
variable msg ! is updated with the resultant message.
Operation requestKey corresponds to step 2. Use
of post-state variables NS ′ and SA′ in the description
of the incoming message msg? models the way Alice
learns these values for future use. Use of the func-
tion inv accesses Alice’s private key for creating her
signature over the nonces.
Finally, pullKey corresponds to Alice receiving
message 4 in which she learns the value of the key K ′
and the current sequence number Q ′ for the group.
The second class specified for the Group Key Pull
protocol is for Sam’s role. Operation respond corre-
sponds to step 2. Like Alice, Sam ensures his nonce
NS ′ has not been used previously. On receiving Al-
ice’s nonce NA′ from the incoming message, he up-
dates the message in transit with his fresh nonce and
the security association SA. Operation giveKey corre-
sponds to step 4 in which Sam receives Alice’s request
for the key in message 3 and sends the group key K
and sequence number Q in message 4.
SamPULL
M : HDR; NA,NS : NON ; G : GID
Q : SEQ ; SA : SEC ; KAS ,K : SYM
KS ,KA : PUB ; used : PMSG
respond
∆(M ,NS ,NA, used); msg?,msg! : MSG
NS
′ 6∈ used ∧ used ′ = used ∪ {NS ′}
msg? = M ′ a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA′ a
G)aNA′ aG)
msg! = M ′ a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA′ a
NS
′ a SA)aNS ′ a SA)
giveKey
msg?,msg! : MSG
msg? = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA a
NS
a enc(inv(KA))(NA aNS ))a
enc(inv(KA))(NA
aNS ))
msg! = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA a
NS
aQ aK a enc(inv(KS ))(NA a
NS ))
aQ aK a enc(inv(KS ))(NA aNS ))
Sam’s role in the Group Key Push protocol has
one operation pushKey , in which he distributes the
new group key K ∗ along with the current group se-
quence number Q and security association SA, all en-
crypted with the previous group key K . Group keys,
sequence numbers and security associations are not
renewed in each protocol instance since they must re-
main the same for each group member participating.
So for our analyses, we assemble various scenarios by
coordinating these values as required in the initialisa-
tion schema Init (in Section 6). Therefore, there is no
need in either of Sam’s roles to ensure they are fresh.
SamPUSH
M : HDR; Q : SEQ ; SA : SEC
K ,K∗ : SYM ; KS : PUB ; used : PMSG
pushKey
∆(M , used); msg! : MSG
M ′ 6∈ used ∧ used ′ = used ∪ {M ′}
msg! = M ′ a enc(K )(Q a SAaK∗ a
enc(inv(KS ))(M
′ aQ a SAaK∗))
Finally, Alice has one operation getKey for receiv-
ing the Group Key Push message. Alice updates her
value of the group key by using the post-state variable
K ′ in the description of the incoming message. Earlier
we mentioned that Alice checks the sequence num-
ber to avoid replay attacks. The value she expects
is based on the value she received previously in the
Group Key Pull protocol. However, at this level we
are focusing on independent roles, hence the value she
uses is hard-coded in the initialisation predicate when
assembling particular scenarios we are interested in.
AlicePUSH
M : HDR; Q : SEQ ; SA : SEC
K : SYM ; KS : PUB
getKey
∆(M ,SA,K ); msg? : MSG
msg? = M ′ a enc(K )(Q a SA′ aK ′a
enc(inv(KS ))(M
′ aQ a SA′ aK ′))
5 Modelling GDOI in AVISPA
AVISPA (Armando et al. 2005) is a tool for the Auto-
mated Validation of Internet Security-sensitive Pro-
tocols and Applications. Protocol roles are mod-
elled in the High-Level Protocol Specification Lan-
guage (HLPSL) as state transition systems in a sim-
ilar way to our Object-Z specification, thus mak-
ing the translation straightforward. The tool trans-
lates HLPSL specifications into an Intermediate For-
mat (IF) describing a single infinite-state transition
system for analysis by any of four back-end tools.
Two of the back-end tools, the On-the-fly Model-
Checker (OFMC) and the Constraint-Logic-based At-
tack Searcher (CL-AtSe), support type flaw detection.
As an example, the following HLPSL role
sam push corresponds to the Object-Z SamPUSH
class. In Object-Z, we equate values used by mul-
tiple roles in particular scenarios in the initialisation
schema. However, in AVISPA we equate such val-
ues by using parameters, and instantiating roles with
particular values at the top-level environment role.
Therefore, those values we wish to control are de-
clared as parameters, whereas, values used within a
single role only are declared as local variables. Declar-
ing the channel with attribute ‘dy’ indicates the pres-
ence of a Dolev-Yao (Dolev & Yao 1983) intruder
who has complete control over messages sent between
agents.
role sam_push(
A, S : agent, Q,SA : text,
K,K2 : symmetric_key,
Ks : public_key,
MSG : channel(dy))
played_by S def=
local
M : text
transition
pushKey.
MSG(start) =|>
M’ := new() /\
MSG(M’.{Q.SA.K2.
{M’.Q.SA.K2}_inv(Ks)}_K) /\
witness(S,A,alice_server_k,K2)
end role
Operation pushKey corresponds to the Object-Z
pushKey operation. In the Object-Z specification we
ensured the new value of the message header was
fresh by checking it was not in the set of used values.
Conveniently, the HLPSL provides a special operator
new() that achieves a similar effect.
The tool analyses authentication properties by at-
tempting to match pairs of witness and request
events. In the above operation, the witness event indi-
cates that Sam intends to agree on key K2 with Alice.
(A protocol id alice server k is used to identify the
pair.) The matching request event is made by Alice
in the following HLPSL role where she learns the new
group key K’.
role alice_push(
A, S : agent, Q : text,
K : symmetric_key,
Ks : public_key,
MSG : channel(dy))
played_by A def=
local
M,SA : text
transition
getKey.
MSG(M’.{Q.SA’.K’.
{M’.Q.SA’.K’}_inv(Ks)}_K) =|>
request(A,S,alice_server_k,K’)
end role
HLPSL provides a generic authentication property
authentication on which, given a protocol id, will
ensure that the request event for that id is always
preceded by the matching witness event. If any of
the supporting tools find a trace in which the request
event is not preceded by the corresponding witness
event, an attack will have been found and will be
presented to the user. Therefore, to ensure the value
Alice accepts for the key is the same as the value Sam
intended for the key, we state ‘authentication on
alice server k’ as the goal. AVISPA allows us to
check more requirements, however, we require only
this one to find the two type flaw attacks.
6 Verifying Attack A
Using the AVISPA model of the GDOI protocol,
AVISPA’s CL-AtSe tool successfully finds the type
flaw attack Meadows et al. (2004) were unable to find
using the NRL Protocol Analyzer. The attack (At-
tack A shown in Figure 5) occurs in the scenario where
the Group Key Pull protocol is run between a dishon-
est member, Carl, and the key server Sam, followed
by the Group Key Push protocol between an honest
member, Alice, and Carl who is posing as Sam.
Being a (dishonest) member of the group, we as-
sume Carl already knows the current sequence num-
ber Q . Since all members of a group have the means
to calculate the next sequence number for identifying
replay attacks on the Group Key Push protocol, he
can produce the next sequence number Q∗ that the
group members are expecting to accompany the new
group key.
Carl initiates the Group Key Pull protocol using as
his nonce NC , the concatenation of a message header
M ∗, the next value of the sequence number Q∗ and
a security association SA∗. Interpreting the compo-
sition of these fields as Carl’s nonce, Sam responds
appropriately with his nonce NS and the security as-
sociation SA in step 2. Continuing the protocol, Carl
sends message 3 in which the fake nonce and Sam’s
nonce are signed with his private key. In step 4 Sam
sends the current sequence number Q and group key
K to Carl, together with his own signature over Carl’s
fake nonce and Sam’s nonce.
Interestingly, if this signature is sent to Alice as
part of a Group Key Push message, she may inter-
pret the concatenation of values M ∗, Q∗, and SA∗,
that Carl chose for his nonce, hence interpreting NS
as the new group key. Knowing this, Carl initiates
an instance of this protocol (step 5) with Alice using
Sam’s signature from the previous protocol. Thus,
Carl will have successfully masqueraded as the trusted
group key server and tricked Alice into believing that
Sam’s nonce is the new group key. Carl can initiate
the Group Key Push protocol with all members of
the group resulting in group communication with an
unauthorised key. Furthermore, future communica-
tion amongst the group will be completely disrupted
for new members and for the group key server.
When this scenario is executed in the AVISPA
tool, on accepting Sam’s nonce as the new group key,
Alice will signal a request event for the value NS .
However, since there is no corresponding witness
event for this value, the CL-AtSe attack searcher will
know that the value Alice received for the key is not
the correct one and that the authentication goal has
been violated.
In order to formally prove the existence of this
attack at the presentation layer and to identify the
specific requirements that suppress it, we first derive
a specification of Carl’s involvement in both instances
as follows.
Carl
M ,M ∗ : HDR; NS : NON ; G : GID
Q ,Q∗ : SEQ ; SA,SA∗ : SEC
KAS ,K : SYM ; KA : PUB
initiate
msg! : MSG
msg! = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(M ∗ a
Q∗ a SA∗ aG)aM ∗ aQ∗ a
SA∗ aG)
requestKey
∆(NS ,SA)
msg?,msg! : MSG
msg? = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(M ∗ a
Q∗ a SA∗ aNS ′ a SA′)aNS ′ a SA′)
msg! = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(M ∗ a
Q∗ a SA∗ aNS ′ a enc(inv(KA))(M ∗ a
Q∗ a SA∗ aNS ′))a enc(inv(KA))(M ∗ a
Q∗ a SA∗ aNS ′))
pushKey
∆(K ,Q)
msg?,msg! : MSG
(∃ sig : ENC •
msg? = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(M ∗a
Q∗ a SA∗ aNS aQ ′ aK ′ a sig)a
Q ′ aK ′ a sig) ∧
msg! = M ∗ a enc(K ′)(Q∗ a SA∗ aNS a sig))
The first two operations, initiate and requestKey ,
are similar to the operations of the same name in
Alice’s role for the Group Key Pull protocol, only the
nonce NA is replaced by the concatenation of values,
M ∗, Q∗ and SA∗. In operation pushKey , Carl uses
the signature sig , created by the server in response
to his dummy request, to create the fake Group Key
Push message.
An instance of each role required to simulate the
scenario in which the attack is present is declared be-
low.
carl : Carl ; samL : SamPULL
samS : SamPUSH ; alice : AlicePUSH
First we specify the initial conditions that must
hold for the attack to be possible in the following ini-
tialisation schema Init . We identify which variables
belong to each agent instance by prefixing them with
the instance name.
Initially, agents will have the same values for cer-
tain state variables such as keys, to ensure they can
communicate successfully. (The group identifier and
sequence number used are also coordinated in this
way.) This information is specified in the initialisa-
tion schema Init .
Init
carl .G = samL.G ∧ carl .KAS = samL.KAS
samL.KS = alice.KS ∧ carl .KA = samL.KA
carl .Q∗ = alice.Q ∧ samL.K = alice.K
Using Object-Z’s sequential composition operator
‘o9’, the single operation attackA specifies the complete
1. C −→ S : M , {h(NC ,G),NC ,G}KCS (NC = M ∗,Q∗,SA∗)
2. S −→ C : M , {h(NC ,NS ,SA),NS ,SA}KCS
3. C −→ S : M , {h(NC ,NS , {NC ,NS}K−1
C
), {NC ,NS}K−1
C
}KCS
4. S −→ C : M , {h(NC ,NS ,Q ,K , {NC ,NS}K−1
S
),Q ,K , {NC ,NS}K−1
S
}KCS
5. C (S ) −→ A : M ∗, {Q∗,SA∗,NS , {M ∗,Q∗,SA∗,NS}K−1
S
}K
Figure 5: Attack A on the GDOI protocol.
sequence of operations that lead to the attack after
initialisation.
attackA =̂ Init ∧ carl .initiate o9
samL.respond o9 carl .requestKey o9
samL.giveKey o9 carl .pushKey o9
alice.getKey
Sequential composition is achieved by taking the
union of the variables in the ∆-list and the conjunc-
tion of both operation predicates, where we assume
the existence of an intermediate state in which the
primed variables from the first operation are equated
with the unprimed variables of the same name in the
second operation. An intermediate state is introduced
by declaring an intermediate variable (identified by a
double-prime) for each state variable. Additionally,
those output variables from the first operation with
the same base name as input variables of the second
operation are equated and hidden. We do this by
introducing an existentially quantified variable to re-
place them in the same way as we do for intermediate
state variables. For example, composition of Carl’s
initiate operation with samL.respond produces an in-
termediate variable msg ′′ as follows.
(∃msg ′′ : MSG •
msg ′′ = carl .M a
enc(carl .KAS )(hsh(carl .KAS )(carl .M ∗ a
carl .Q∗ a carl .SA∗ a carl .G)a carl .M ∗ a
carl .Q∗ a carl .SA∗ a carl .G) ∧
msg ′′ = samL.M ′ a
enc(samL.KAS )(hsh(samL.KAS )(samL.NA′ a
samL.G)a samL.NA′ a samL.G))
Since we know carl .G = samL.G and carl .KAS =
samL.KAS from initialisation, and due to the con-
straints placed on presentation layer data types in
Section 4, we can derive the equalities samL.M ′ =
carl .M and (more importantly) samL.NA′ =
carl .M ∗ a carl .Q∗ a carl .SA∗, allowing us to reason
about type flaw attacks in more detail.
Composition of the entire sequence of operations
defining the attack trace attackA results in the follow-
ing schema.
attackA
∆(samL.M , samL.NS , samL.NA, alice.SA
samL.used , carl .NS , carl .SA,
carl .K , carl .Q , alice.M , alice.K )
carl .G = samL.G ∧ carl .KAS = samL.KAS
carl .KA = samL.KA ∧ carl .Q∗ = alice.Q
samL.K = alice.K ∧ samL.KS = alice.KS
carl .SA′ = samL.SA ∧ carl .NS ′ = samL.NS ′
samL.NS
′ 6∈ samL.used
samL.used
′ = samL.used ∪ {samL.NS ′}
samL.M
′ = carl .M ∧ alice.K ′ = samL.NS ′
samL.NA
′ = carl .M ∗ a carl .Q∗ a carl .SA∗
carl .K ′ = samL.K ∧ carl .Q ′ = samL.Q
alice.M ′ = carl .M ∗ ∧ alice.SA′ = carl .SA∗
Based on the authentication requirement analysed
by the tool, a suitable requirement for our verification
is that by the end of the Group Key Push protocol,
the values that Sam and Alice have for the new group
key are identical. Therefore, insecurity of this proto-
col is proven by demonstrating that after the attack,
these values are not equal.
attackA ⇒ samS .K ∗′ 6= alice.K ′
We know that after the attack, Alice’s value for
the group key is equal to the value of Sam’s nonce
(alice.K ′ = samL.NS ′). It is reasonable to assume
that the value for Sam’s nonce is not equal to the
value Sam has for the new group key (samL.NS ′ 6=
samS .K ∗), and with this assumption we can conclude
that the above predicate holds, thus verifying insecu-
rity of the protocol.
The attack operation also reveals the following two
conditions that must be preserved by the presentation
layer for the attack to succeed.
(∃ samL.NA′ : NON •
samL.NA′ = carl .M ∗ a carl .Q∗ a carl .SA∗)
(∃ alice.K ′ : KEY ; samL.NS ′ : NON •
alice.K ′ = samL.NS ′)
The first condition states that a nonce can be con-
structed from items carl .M ∗, carl .Q∗ and carl .SA∗.
If this condition is not met, Sam will not accept mes-
sage 1 from Carl and the protocol will be aborted.
The second condition states that Alice can interpret
a nonce as a key. If this condition is not met, she will
not accept message 5 and again the protocol will be
aborted.
These results are somewhat expected; however, we
now know for certain that the attack will be prevented
by avoiding at least one of these conditions. Thus,
the negation of these conditions forms a special pre-
sentation layer requirement, providing an Object-Z
specification of the protocol secure against this at-
tack, without having to make any additional changes
to the application layer design. Either of the following
two conditions must hold to prevent the attack.
¬(∃ samL.NA′ : NON •
samL.NA′ = carl .M ∗ a carl .Q∗ a carl .SA∗)
¬(∃ alice.K ′ : KEY ; samL.NS ′ : NON •
alice.K ′ = samL.NS ′)
7 Verifying Attack B
The CL-AtSe tool also successfully finds the type flaw
attack (Attack B shown in Figure 6) Meadows et
al. (2004) found using the NRL Protocol Analyzer,
this time in the scenario where the intruder, Dan D ,
has discovered the key KAS shared between Alice and
Sam, and hence also the group key K and sequence
number. Additionally, it assumes Alice may play the
part of both a member and key server of the same
group. Firstly, the Group Key Pull protocol is run
between member Alice and Dan, whom she believes
is the key server, Sam. Then the Group Key Push
protocol is run between Dan (posing as Alice in her
key server role) and group member Bob.
Alice initiates a Group Key Pull protocol with the
key server, Sam. However, Dan intercepts message 1
and impersonates Sam by sending message 2 to Alice
using the concatenation of the next value of the se-
quence number Q∗, a security association SA∗, and a
key K ∗ as the value for the nonce ND . Following the
protocol, Alice creates a signature from her nonce and
the value she believes is Sam’s nonce. Once again, this
signature could be passed off as the signature used in
the Group Key Push protocol, this time where Alice’s
nonce is interpreted as the message header. Dan can
use this signature and the group key he already knows
to create a Group Key Push message (step 5). Thus,
Dan will have successfully tricked Alice into accepting
his chosen key K ∗ for secure communication amongst
the group. Formalisation of Dan’s behaviour follows.
Dan
M : HDR; NA : NON ; G : GID ; Q
∗ : SEQ
SA,SA∗ : SEC ; KAS ,K ,K∗ : SYM
respond
∆(M ,NA)
msg?,msg! : MSG
msg? = M ′ a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA′ a
G)aNA′ aG)
msg! = M ′ a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NA′ a
Q∗ a SA∗ aK∗ a SA)aQ∗ a
SA∗ aK∗ a SA)
pushKey
msg?,msg! : MSG
(∃ sig : ENC •
msg? = M a enc(KAS )(hsh(KAS )(NAa
Q∗ a SA∗ aK∗ a sig)a sig)
msg! = NA
a enc(K )(Q∗ a SA∗ aK∗ a sig))
Operation respond is similar to the operation of
the same name in Sam’s role where Sam’s nonce is
replaced by the concatenation of the three decorated
values chosen by Dan. In operation pushKey , Dan
accepts Alice’s request for the key and sends a Group
Key Push message using the signature sig created by
Alice in order to pose as her.
Once again, the required roles are coordinated to
simulate the scenario in which the attack is found.
Alice is playing the part of both a group member
in the Group Key Pull protocol aliceL : AlicePULL
and a server in the Group Key Push protocol aliceS :
SamPUSH .
aliceL : AlicePULL ∧ dan : Dan
bob : AlicePUSH ∧ aliceS : SamPUSH
The initialisation predicate is specified below co-
ordinating state variables belonging to each of the
participating roles. Since the attack depends on Dan
having discovered the key KAS shared between Al-
ice and Sam, we specify that dan.KAS = aliceL.KAS .
Additionally, Dan knows the group for which Alice is
establishing a key (dan.G = aliceL.G) and the key
K used for the group (dan.K = bob.K ). He also
knows the current sequence number which means that
the next value Q∗ of the sequence number is the one
Bob is expecting in the Group Key Push protocol
(dan.Q∗ = bob.Q). Alice plays the role of the server
in the Group Key Push protocol with Bob which
means that her public key is the key Bob has for the
server (aliceS .KA = bob.KS ). It is also important to
state that Alice’s public key is the same in both of
her roles (aliceL.KA = aliceS .KA).
Init
dan.G = aliceL.G ∧ dan.KAS = aliceL.KAS
aliceL.KA = aliceS .KA ∧ dan.Q∗ = bob.Q
dan.K = bob.K ∧ aliceL.KA = bob.KS
We simulate the attack sequence by evaluating the
sequential composition of the operations leading to
the attack after initialisation.
attackB =̂ Init ∧ aliceL.initiate o9 dan.respond o9
aliceL.requestKey o9 dan.pushKey o9
bob.getKey
Composition of the operations defining the attack
trace attackB results in the following schema.
attackB
∆(aliceL.M , aliceL.NA, aliceL.used , aliceL.NS ,
aliceL.SA, dan.M , dan.NA, bob.M , bob.SA,
bob.K )
dan.G = aliceL.G ∧ dan.KAS = aliceL.KAS
dan.NA
′ = aliceL.NA′ ∧ dan.Q∗ = bob.Q
dan.K = bob.K ∧ aliceL.KA = bob.KS
aliceL.KA = aliceS .KA ∧ dan.M ′ = aliceL.M ′
{aliceL.M ′, aliceL.NA′} ∩ aliceL.used = ∅
aliceL.used
′ = aliceL.used ∪ {aliceL.M ′, aliceL.NA′}
aliceL.NS
′ = dan.Q∗ a dan.SA∗ a dan.K∗
aliceL.SA = dan.SA ∧ bob.M ′ = aliceL.NA′
bob.SA′ = dan.SA∗ ∧ bob.K ′ = dan.K∗
This time, insecurity of this protocol is proven by
demonstrating that after the attack, the value Bob
has for the new group key is not identical to the one
distributed by Alice in her server role.
attackB ⇒ aliceS .K ∗′ 6= bob.K ′
From the equalities formed in attackB , we know
that Bob’s value of the new key is the same as the
value Dan has chosen for the new group key (bob.K ′ =
dan.K ∗). It is reasonable to assume that the value he
chose is not equivalent to the value Alice had chosen
for the new group key (aliceS .K ∗ 6= dan.K ∗). With
this additional assumption the theorem above is true.
Hence, we have verified Attack B.
Again we notice two conditions in the attack
schema that must be preserved by the presentation
layer for Attack B to succeed, and again, negating
these produces the following two preventative condi-
tions, one of which must hold to secure the protocol
against the attack.
¬(∃ aliceL.NS ′ : NON •
dan.Q∗ a dan.SA∗ a dan.K ∗)
¬(∃ bob.M ′ : HDR; dan.NA′ : NON •
bob.M ′ = dan.NA′)
In practice, the GDOI specification now contains
an informal presentation layer requirement that each
signed message must contain a single tag, identifying
whether it belongs to the Group Key Pull or Group
Key Push protocol (Meadows et al. 2004). This is for-
mally specified in the following predicate ensuring the
1. A −→ D(S ) : M , {h(NA,G),NA,G}KAS
2. D(S ) −→ A : M , {h(NA,ND ,SA),ND ,SA}KAS (ND = Q∗,SA∗,K ∗)
3. A −→ D(S ) : M , {h(NA,ND , {NA,ND}K−1
A
), {NA,ND}K−1
A
}KAS
5. D(A) −→ B : NA, {Q∗,SA∗,K ∗, {NA,Q∗,SA∗,K ∗}K−1
A
}K
Figure 6: Attack B on the GDOI protocol.
content type of the two signatures is distinguishable
for all possible combinations of items. We know from
our formal proofs that this requirement successfully
secures the protocol from the two type flaw attacks
since it implies both of the derived requirements.
(∀NA,NS : NON ; M : HDR; Q : SEQ ;
SA : SEC ; K : KEY •
NA aNS 6= M aQ a SAaK )
8 Conclusion
In this paper we provided a formal specification of
the Group Domain of Interpretation protocol using
Object-Z, in which both the application and presen-
tation layers were present. We were required to spec-
ify presentation layer constraints on the data types,
allowing agents to interpret messages correctly when
they agree on the type structure of the message, but
allowing multiple potential interpretations otherwise.
Since the two models of differing detail are encapsu-
lated within the one specification, there was no need
for complex transformations from one to the other.
We combined the relative strengths of model
checking and theorem proving to verify the specifi-
cation and to secure it against two type flaw attacks.
The application layer model was analysed using the
AVISPA model checking tool to find the attacks. Sub-
sequently, we verified the attacks against the presen-
tation layer model using the Object-Z schema calcu-
lus, confirming the assumptions that allow the attacks
and deriving the presentation layer requirements that
prevent them. Furthermore, we confirmed that the
approach taken by GDOI to distinguish between the
content of signatures is sufficient to secure the proto-
col against both attacks, independent of other tagging
schemes used.
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